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Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding: Why 
Qualified Immunity Is a Poor Fit in Fourth Amendment 
School Search Cases 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Safford Unified School 
District #1 v. Redding (“Safford”),1 a case regarding the civil rights 
standards to which lower-education school officials are held when they 
conduct a search of a student’s property. In its only other Fourth 
Amendment school search decision, the 1985 decision of New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.,2 the Court applied a two-prong test, which was based on a mere 
reasonableness standard or whether common sense was used by the 
school official.3 The Court adopted this standard so that educators would 
not be required to remain well-versed on Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure law, which is constantly in flux due to judicial decisions. 
Regrettably, in Safford the Court failed to reiterate the mere 
reasonableness standard and instead applied the more complex 
reasonable suspicion standard.4 While the Court did not explicitly do 
this, a careful comparison of the two cases shows this is the most 
reasonable understanding of Safford. This is unfortunate because, while 
some may argue the standards are the same, reasonable suspicion is a 
more complicated and case-law based standard than what the Court 
described in T.L.O. Applying such a standard contradicts the policy of 
T.L.O. that school officials should not be required to remain abreast of 
changes in Fourth Amendment law.5
Secondly, this was the Court’s first opportunity to apply both the 
T.L.O. test and the qualified immunity standard in a school search case. 
The mere reasonableness standard from T.L.O. makes qualified 
immunity very difficult to apply because it looks to common sense and 
not to current case law while, in contrast, qualified immunity considers 
whether current case law has put the governmental actor on notice that 
the action was unconstitutional. This is possibly the reason the Court 
 1. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 2. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 3. Arguably, the Court used reasonable suspicion rather than mere reasonableness in T.L.O. 
For a discussion of why I conclude the Court established a mere reasonableness standard see infra 
Part II.A. 
 4. 129 S. Ct. 2633. 
 5. 469 U.S. at 343. 
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failed to utilize the mere reasonableness standard and relied on the 
reasonable suspicion standard. 
A likely result of Safford is that school officials now have more 
protections than qualified immunity normally grants. I refer to this as 
“qualified immunity plus.” After all, if the search that occurred in 
Safford was not enough to overcome the qualified immunity defense, it is 
difficult to imagine a situation where the school official would be held 
liable. Qualified immunity plus is an appropriate standard for school 
officials—especially classroom teachers. They should have a broader 
shield than other government actors because their principal role is not 
law enforcement but rather educating the youth. However, courts should 
explicitly state that school officials are granted a higher protection from 
civil suit than other government officials. Otherwise, school officials will 
be granted qualified immunity plus but courts will refer to the standard as 
qualified immunity. This could cause a slippery slope where other 
government officials asserting qualified immunity could be granted the 
additional protections of qualified immunity plus. Inversely, the civil 
rights protections offered by § 1983 actions could be weakened because 
school officials are offered qualified immunity plus, but it is termed 
merely “qualified immunity.” 
The two points from the preceding paragraphs—that in Safford the 
Court distanced itself from the mere reasonableness standard and that 
school officials now are given qualified immunity plus—are illustrative 
of my principal thesis that qualified immunity is a poor fit with school 
search law. The Court may resolve this problem in two ways. First, it 
could explicitly abandon the rationale of T.L.O., rely on reasonable 
suspicion for school searches, and require teachers to remain informed of 
Fourth Amendment law. This is a poor solution because it places an 
unrealistic expectation on teachers. Second, the Court (or Congress) 
could declare that qualified immunity does not fit with school search 
standards and provide qualified immunity plus. Rather than possibly 
weakening civil rights protections by granting greater protections than 
qualified immunity should, the courts should decide that school 
officials—particularly teachers—are due absolute immunity in § 1983 
actions regarding school searches. This proposal is logical due to 
alternative remedies in school settings, such as the intense political 
pressure parents place on school boards to adopt policies and procedures 
to protect students and the relative ease of firing administrators and 
teachers for civil rights violations.6
 6. Documentation of these remedies is beyond the scope of this paper. Consequently, I 
assume that they exist and help to justify removing teachers from § 1983 school search cases. 
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Part II discusses the Safford decision and the law established by 
T.L.O. Part III lays out the history and current state of § 1983 actions and 
the defense of qualified immunity. Part IV demonstrates that applying 
qualified immunity to school search standards is problematic. Part V 
specifically shows how qualified immunity actually provides qualified 
immunity plus in school search cases, and Part VI outlines other issues 
that arise from the problems identified in Part IV. Finally, Part VII 
concludes that granting teachers absolute immunity provides a better 
solution than adopting the reasonable suspicion standard. 
 
II.  SAFFORD AND T.L.O. 
 
Safford was a significant case because it was the first time the Court 
applied the test it set out in T.L.O. This section first describes T.L.O. It 
then lays out the facts of Safford. Lastly, it discusses the Court’s Safford 
opinion and the concurring in part and dissenting in part opinions. 
 
A.  Significant Legal Background 
 
The principal precedent-setting case for Safford was New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.7 However, prior to T.L.O., the Supreme Court laid the 
groundwork for § 1983 actions to be filed against teachers and school 
administrators in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District by stating that neither “students [n]or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”8 Tinker’s guaranteeing of First Amendment rights to 
students established precedent for the protections of other fundamental 
rights in schools, such as Fourth Amendment rights regarding searches. 
In T.L.O., the Court initially granted certiorari to determine whether 
the exclusionary rule9 applies in criminal proceedings when an unlawful 
search was conducted by a school official.10 However, the Court ordered 
re-arguments focusing on the standard for determining the lawfulness of 
searches performed by school officials.11 T.L.O. was a high school 
student that had been caught smoking in the girls’ bathroom by a 
teacher.12 When T.L.O. denied she had been smoking, the assistant 
 7. 469 U.S. 325. 
 8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 9. The exclusionary rule “excludes or suppresses evidence [in a criminal proceeding] 
obtained in violation of an accused person’s constitutional rights.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 606 
(8TH ed. 2004). 
 10. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
 11. Id. at 327–28. 
 12. Id. at 328. 
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principal opened her purse and pulled out a package of cigarettes.13 
When he removed the cigarettes, the administrator saw a package of 
rolling papers, which caused him to suspect that T.L.O. had marijuana in 
her purse. He then conducted a second, more extensive search of the 
purse and found “a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of 
empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an 
index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, 
and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing.”14 In a 
subsequent juvenile delinquency proceeding, T.L.O. sought to suppress 
the results of the search under the exclusionary rule, claiming her Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated by the school administrator’s 
search.15
The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress evidence, and 
“found T.L.O. to be a delinquent.”16 The appellate court reversed on 
Fifth Amendment grounds, and the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed 
both lower-court decisions and ordered suppression of the items based on 
the Fourth Amendment.17 After rehearing arguments, the U.S. Supreme 
Court established a reasonableness standard for searches of students by 
school officials.18 It held that the search of T.L.O.’s purse was 
reasonable and, thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.19
The first issue the Court addressed was whether Fourth Amendment 
protections applied to unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by 
school officials.20 The Court cited several cases that applied Fourth 
Amendment protections to searches conducted by other state actors such 
as building inspectors,21 health inspectors,22 and firemen.23 It then held 
that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches by school officials24 
based on the policy that the Fourth Amendment protects people from any 
state actor, regardless of whether the actor’s goal is criminal 
investigation or other regulatory purposes.25
After determining that the Fourth Amendment applies to school 
searches,26 the Court addressed the issue of what standard should be 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 329. 
 16. Id. at 330. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 341–342. 
 19. Id. at 347. 
 20. Id. at 333. 
 21. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 22. Marshall v. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
 23. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). 
 24. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. 
 25. Id. at 335. 
 26. Throughout this Note, I use the term “school searches” to signify searches conducted by 
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applied to determine whether a school search violates the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court acknowledged the competing interests that 
students have some expectation of privacy at school (privacy interest), 
while the school, on the other hand, has a pressing interest in 
discipline—which interest has increased over the years.27
In its key reasoning, the Court pointed out the importance of 
informality and flexibility when establishing rules that teachers and 
administrators will have to follow.28 The Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require school officials to “obtain a [search] 
warrant before searching a student who is under their authority,” and that 
the level of suspicion does not have to reach the level of probable 
cause.29 Rather, school officials’ actions should be judged on a mere 
reasonableness standard in a two-part test: (1) was there a reasonable 
expectation the search would discover evidence of wrongdoing; and (2) 
were “the measures adopted . . . reasonably related to the objectives of 
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction”?30 In adopting a reasonableness 
standard rather than probable cause, the Court acknowledged that 
teachers should not be required to follow the complex and ever changing 
rules governing probable cause: “By focusing attention on the question 
of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school 
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of 
probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to 
the dictates of reason and common sense.”31
In applying this new standard to the facts in T.L.O., the Court held 
that two searches occurred: one for cigarettes based on the suspicion of 
the teacher catching T.L.O. smoking, and a second for drug 
paraphernalia based on what the administrator saw when he removed the 
cigarettes.32 The Court held that both searches were reasonable in their 
inception and in the manner in which they were carried out.33
There were two concurrences and Justice Brennan dissented in part, 
ardently arguing that the Court had established an unclear standard in a 
realm of the law—school law—where clear standards are desirable. 
Brennan argued against a balancing test and for probable cause to be the 
school officials. 
 27. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
 28. Id. at 339–40. 
 29. Id. at 340–41. 
 30. Id. at 342. The Court failed to elaborate on exactly how the age and sex of the student 
affects the analysis. As Safford also failed to address this subject, it is not within the scope of this 
Note and will not receive further consideration. 
 31. Id. at 343 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 343–44. 
 33. Id. at 346–47. 
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standard of whether school searches are constitutional34 because teachers 
will not be able to easily understand what the reasonableness standard 
entails.35
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.36 Primarily, 
Stevens argued that the Court should have decided the case on its 
original petition for certiorari and not ordered a rehearing on a different 
issue.37 One footnote towards the end of his decision, however, directly 
addressed the issue that would eventually come before the Court in 
Safford. After arguing for a more stringent standard for school official 
searches, Justice Stevens noted: 
One thing is clear under any standard—the shocking strip searches 
that are described in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse. “It 
does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of 
a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some 
magnitude.”38
Given Justice Stevens’s strong language regarding school strip 
searches, it is surprising that over two decades passed before the Court 
heard a case on this topic. 
 
B.  Facts and Procedural History 
 
The facts surrounding Safford occurred in the fall of 2003 in Safford, 
Arizona. By way of background, Safford is a small community roughly 
170 miles southeast of Phoenix. In 2003, the population was around 
10,000.39 Savana Redding was an eighth grade student at Safford Middle 
School, which educates around 600 students from sixth, seventh, and 
eighth grades.40 While the school had experienced issues with drugs over 
the years, the record before the appellate courts was both incomplete and 
contested by Redding, thus the courts did not allow prior incidents 
regarding drug possession by other students to carry any weight in their 
decisions.41
 34. Id. at 357–58 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 35. Id. at 365–66. 
 36. Id. at 370–386. 
 37. Id. at 371. 
 38. Id. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Doe v. 
Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92–93 (7th Cir. 1980)) (internal citations omitted). 
 39. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 40. See id. 
 41. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 504 F.3d 828, 829 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), en banc, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 
2633 (2009). The school rule banning any medications, both prescription and over-the-counter, was 
put in place a couple of years before this incident because a student had ingested pills at school and 
become violently ill to the point that he was hospitalized. Brief of Appellant at 3, Safford, 504 F.3d 
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In August at the back-to-school dance, several teachers and staff 
members noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from a rowdy group of 
students, which included Savana Redding, Marissa Glines, and Jordan 
Romero.42 During the dance alcohol and cigarettes were found in the 
girls’ restroom of the school.43
On October 1, roughly six weeks after the dance, Jordan Romero and 
his mother met with the school’s assistant principal Kerry Wilson. 
Jordan’s mother was concerned because Jordan had been extremely sick 
the night before, and he claimed the cause was pills that he had received 
from a classmate,44 who was presumably neither Marissa nor Savana.45 
In this meeting Jordan told Wilson that he had attended a party at Savana 
Redding’s house before the back-to-school dance, that alcohol was 
served at the party, and that Savana’s parents knew of the alcohol and 
failed to take any steps to prevent it from being served.46 Next, he 
reported that “certain students were bringing drugs and weapons on 
campus.”47
One week later, on October 8, Jordan approached Wilson before 
school started and gave Wilson a white pill.48 He stated that Marissa had 
given it to him and that “students were planning to take the pills at 
lunch.”49 Wilson took the pill to the school nurse, Peggy Schwallier, who 
identified it as prescription strength, 400-milligram ibuprofen.50 When 
school began, Wilson pulled Marissa from her class, and the teacher of 
the class gave him a planner that had been in the desk adjacent to 
Marissa and apparently belonged to Marissa.51 When the planner was 
opened it contained “several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a 
cigarette.”52 Marissa denied ownership of the planner and its contents.53
Once in his office, Wilson had a female administrative assistant, 
Helen Romero, come into his office, and Wilson asked Marissa to turn 
out her pockets.54 Marissa did so and produced several white pills 
828 (No. 05-15759). 
 42. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1075. 
 43. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641. 
 44. See id. at 2640. 
 45. Had Romero received the pill from one of these girls, one of the appellate courts likely 
would have mentioned it. Furthermore, a third student was questioned as a suspected pill distributor 
but not strip-searched on the day Marissa and Savana were searched. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1077 n.5. 
 46. See id. at 1076. 
 47. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640 (citation omitted). 
 48. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076. 
 49. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076. 
 52. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638. 
 53. Id. at 2640. 
 54. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076. 
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identical to the one Jordan had previously given Wilson, a blue pill later 
identified as an over-the-counter 200 milligram anti-inflammatory called 
naproxen,55 and a razor blade.56 Wilson asked where the blue pill came 
from, and Marissa replied, “‘I guess it slipped in when she gave me the 
IBU 400s.’”57 After a follow-up question Marissa clarified that the “she” 
who had given her the pills was Savana Redding.58
Next, Wilson had Ms. Romero accompany Marissa to the nurse’s 
office so a strip search could be conducted.59 The strip search entailed 
Marissa pulling up her shirt and pulling out her bra and shaking it.60 She 
also removed her pants and pulled out the waistband of her underpants 
and shook them.61 No additional contraband was found.62
After this search, Mr. Wilson summoned Savana to his office. 
Savana was a thirteen-year-old honor student63 who “had never 
[previously] been disciplined for any infraction of school rules.”64 The 
information that gave rise to Mr. Wilson’s suspicion of Savana was (1) 
Jordan’s statement that the alcohol had been served at a party at Savana’s 
home and (2) Marissa’s statement that Savana had provided her the 
pills.65 However, Marissa had not stated when Savana allegedly gave her 
the pills nor if she knew of any additional pills in Savana’s possession.66
When Wilson first showed Savana the day planner, Savana admitted 
that she owned the day planner, but not any of its contents.67 She stated 
that she had lent the planner to Marissa a few days earlier because 
Marissa wanted a place to hide “cigarettes, a lighter and some jewelry.”68 
Savana denied any knowledge or possession of the pills.69 She then 
consented to a search of her backpack which was conducted by Ms. 
 55. The blue pill was a generic version of the over the counter anti-inflammatory Aleve. 
 56. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640. 
 57. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 504 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, en banc, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 
(2009). 
 58. Id. 
 59. The Court addressed use of the term “strip search,” and stated that several terms could be 
used for the search that occurred in this case, but strip search was accurate and sufficiently served 
the Court’s purposes. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641. 
 60. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1077. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1074. 
 64. Id. at 1077. 
 65. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009). 
 66. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1083. Indeed Wilson’s failure to ask Marissa follow-up questions 
regarding these points was pointed out by the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1075 n.2. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Redding, 129 S. Ct., 2638. 
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Romero; no contraband was found.70 Wilson then ordered a strip search 
of Savana.71 In the nurse’s office, Savana was initially asked to remove 
her coat, shoes, and socks; nothing was found in these items.72 She was 
next asked to remove her T-shirt and stretch pants—neither of which had 
any pockets.73 Again, nothing was found. Finally, she was asked to pull 
out her bra and then her underpants waistband and shake them.74 No 
additional pills were discovered.75 Savana put her clothes back on and 
returned to Mr. Wilson’s office.76
When Savana’s mother learned of the search, she requested a 
meeting with Mr. Wilson. Afterwards she filed a § 1983 civil rights 
action against the school district, Wilson, the administrative assistant, 
Romero, and the school nurse, Schwallier.77 Ms. Redding filed the § 
1983 action in the Federal District Court of Arizona.78 The court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on qualified immunity grounds.79 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a split decision.80 Subsequently, 
the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the initial three-
judge panel. The en banc court held that the search constituted a 
constitutional violation and Mr. Wilson was not entitled to qualified 
immunity.81
 
C.  The Court’s Safford Decision 
 
1.  The strip search 
 
The Court held that the strip search of Savana Redding was 
unreasonable and violated her Fourth Amendment rights, but that the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.82 Consequently, Redding 
did not recover any damages, fees, or expenses. Justice Souter wrote the 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1075. 
 77. Id. at 1077. 
 78. Id. 
 79. It is unclear what happened regarding the school district as a defendant. The Supreme 
Court remanded regarding the school district because the Ninth Circuit case did not address it at all. 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644. 
 80. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 504 F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, en banc, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 
(2009). 
 81. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 82. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637–38. 
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majority opinion in Safford. Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito joined in the majority.83 Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg each joined the majority opinion insofar as it found the search a 
Fourth Amendment violation, but dissented over whether qualified 
immunity should apply.84 Justice Thomas, conversely, concurred in 
granting qualified immunity and dissented over whether the search 
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.85
In reaching a decision as to whether the strip search of Savana 
Redding violated her Fourth Amendment rights, the Court first addressed 
the standard that would judge the search. The Court provided a brief 
discussion on probable cause—stating it is the customary standard 
applied to searches and that the Court has struggled in clearly defining 
it.86 The Court defined probable cause, for purposes of searches, as 
whether there is a “‘fair probability’ or a ‘substantial chance’ of 
discovering evidence of criminal activity.”87 The Court relied on T.L.O. 
for the proposition that the standard governing school searches is 
somewhat lower than probable cause, and defined the standard, which 
justified searches by school officials if there existed “a moderate chance 
of finding evidence of wrongdoing.”88
The Court’s application of the T.L.O. standard is confusing because 
it alternates between the language of T.L.O. and the traditional probable 
cause/reasonable suspicion used in other Fourth Amendment cases. The 
Court held that the information known to Wilson was sufficient “to 
justify a search of Savana’s backpack and outer clothing.”89 However, on 
the issue of the strip search the Court reasoned that “both subjective and 
reasonable societal expectations . . . requir[e] distinct elements of 
justification.”90 Thus, it appears that the standard established is: a 
moderate suspicion of wrongdoing justifies any search by a school 
official, except a strip search. In instances where the student is required 
to remove any article of clothing that will expose undergarments, some 
additional justification would be required. Without citing any authority, 
the Court reverted back to probable cause/reasonable suspicion analysis 
 83. Id. at 2637. 
 84. Id. at 2644–45. 
 85. Id. at 2646–58. 
 86. Id. at 2639. 
 87. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.14 (1983)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 88. Id. It should be noted that while the Court often uses the language from the rules 
regarding school searches and police searches interchangeably, in a school search all that is required 
is suspicion of a violation of school rules. However, for a police search there must be suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
 89. Id. at 2641. 
 90. Id. 
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to support the rule that more than a mere suspicion is required for a strip 
search; the Court reasoned that Savana possessed both a subjective belief 
(demonstrated by her statement of being embarrassed, frightened, and 
humiliated) and an objective belief (based on adolescent vulnerability) 
that her privacy would not be invaded to the extent of a strip search.91
Rather than simply state that strip searches require probable cause—
which would have provided a bright line rule but contradicted T.L.O. by 
requiring school officials to become versed in probable cause case law—
the Court reverted mid-paragraph back to the T.L.O. rule by quoting that 
the search, as executed, must be “‘reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ . . . The 
scope will be permissible, that is, when it is ‘not excessively intrusive in 
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’”92 
In applying this second prong of the T.L.O. test, the Court considered the 
type of drugs Wilson was searching for and the evidence that pills were 
hidden in Savana’s underwear.93 The Court held that the strip search was 
unreasonable because the school officials were merely looking for over-
the-counter and prescription-strength anti-inflammatory pills, and 
because there was no evidence of hiding pills on one’s person in regards 
to Savana specifically or of a general practice within the school.94 At the 
end of the analysis, the Court apparently attempted to clarify its 
confusing language by stating a clear standard—reasonable suspicion—
for school strip searches. However, the paragraph that articulates this 
standard describes it as in conformance with T.L.O. but fails to 
acknowledge the difference between the common sense reasonableness 
from T.L.O. and reasonable suspicion as used in other Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure cases. 
The Court’s decision regarding the strip search is disappointing in 
two regards. First, it failed to clearly follow the T.L.O. test. Doing so 
would have provided lower courts some parameters on the vague second 
prong of the test regarding the reasonableness of the scope of the search 
given the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 
Second, and more problematic, the Court failed to state whether the 
reasonable suspicion required for a school strip search is derived from 
T.L.O.—which considers age, sex, and the nature of the infraction—or is 
the equivalent to the reasonable suspicion required by law enforcement 
for temporary stops and searches under the Terry v. Ohio line of cases.95 
 91. Id. at 2641–42. 
 92. Id. at 2642 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Terry v. Ohio established reasonable suspicion as the standard for limited searches and 
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Because “reasonable suspicion” is such a common term in Fourth 
Amendment case law, school administrators must assume that the 
reasonable suspicion in Safford is equivalent to the standard imposed on 
law enforcement officers. Thus, the entire policy supporting T.L.O. of 
not applying the complex probable cause standard to school officials is 
circumvented because the reasonable suspicion standard is arguably just 
as complex in the case law as that of probable cause.96
 
2.  Qualified immunity 
 
The Court’s entire section on qualified immunity comprised less than 
one page of the decision, even though this was the principal 
disagreement between the majority and the Justices that dissented in part. 
There is only one qualified immunity test for all government officials. 
Consequently, the Court applied the same qualified immunity test to the 
school officials in Safford that it applied earlier in the term in a case that 
did not regard school law.97 The Court defined qualified immunity as 
immunity for government officials accused of performing 
unconstitutional searches “‘where clearly established law does not show 
that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.’”98 It explained that 
qualified immunity is not applicable if clear case law exists that holds the 
type of search at issue to be unconstitutional.99 Qualified immunity is 
also not applicable in circumstances of “outrageous conduct.”100 
Furthermore, the Court stated that if the law sufficiently put government 
officials on notice, then qualified immunity may not be appropriate even 
if the government official’s conduct presents a “‘novel factual 
circumstance.’”101 Thus in order to successfully claim qualified 
seizures performed by police officers as opposed to the higher standard of probable cause. 392 U.S. 
1, 20–21 (1968). Since Terry, there have been a considerable number of cases that addressed the 
reasonable suspicion standard. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (allowing 
an officer to reach into a car and seize a weapon hidden on the body of a suspect, when knowledge 
of the weapon was based on an informant); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1977) 
(creating the bright-line rule, based on Terry, that an officer can order a driver out of a vehicle when 
the stop was merely for a traffic violation). 
 96. Admittedly, T.L.O. does use the term “reasonable suspicion,” but a careful reading of the 
case, or a simple search of the term reasonable, shows that the T.L.O. Court established a tort-like 
reasonableness standard and not the reasonable suspicion standard commonly linked with Terry v. 
Ohio. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337–43. 
 97. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting the rule from Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 
822 (2009)). Pearson dealt with a drug task force’s warrantless arrest outside of a home and 
subsequent search of the residence. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 813–14. 
 98. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822). 
 99. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 US. 603, 615 (1999)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). For example, if the duties and 
rights are clearly defined by the Court, a “novel factual circumstance” will not guarantee that 
qualified immunity is applicable. 
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immunity, the school officials in Safford had to show that (1) there was 
not clearly established case law holding similar facts analogous to this 
case to be unconstitutional, (2) the strip search as conducted may later 
have been found to be unconstitutional by dispassionate judges, but not 
outrageously so, and (3) the general guiding principles of the law were 
not established sufficiently to give notice that the “novel” facts regarding 
the search in the case constituted a clear constitutional violation. 
Regarding the first requirement, the Court held that there was 
sufficient divergence in the case law to conclude no established law 
existed.102 The Court first cited the divergence of opinions from the 
Ninth Circuit in this case.103 This analysis is unhelpful to future courts 
because a school administrator, in determining whether a search would 
be appropriate, will not know in advance how a majority of judges on the 
circuit where the school is located would rule on the specific facts 
currently before the administrator. Next, the Court turned to the case law 
on the topic.104 It noted courts’ difficulty in applying the T.L.O. standard 
and cited circuit court cases that dealt with strip searches. In Williams v. 
Ellington “the Sixth Circuit upheld a strip search of a high school student 
for a drug, without any suspicion that drugs were hidden next to her 
body.”105 In Thomas v. Roberts the Eleventh Circuit “grant[ed] qualified 
immunity to a teacher and police officer who conducted a group strip 
search of a fifth grade class when looking for a missing $26.”106
The Court then held that qualified immunity should be granted 
because the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as a sizable minority of 
the Ninth Circuit judges that heard Safford, all allowed strip searches 
based on little to no suspicion; thus, the case law was not established that 
a strip search violated the Fourth Amendment when the search was for 
drugs and there was no reasonable suspicion that the student currently 
had drugs hidden on her body.107 The Court included the following 
caveat to this type of reasoning that granted qualified immunity due to a 
disagreement among judges: 
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the 
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ. 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(en banc)) (“[O]ther courts considering qualified immunity for strip searches have read T.L.O. as ‘a 
series of abstractions, on the one hand, and a declaration of seeming deference to the judgments of 
school officials, on the other . . . .’”). 
 105. Id. (citing Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 882–83 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 106. Id. at 2643–44 (citing Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003)). For a brief 
discussion of how informants now play a role in determining reasonable suspicion for strip searches 
in schools, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Jacqueline Joy Cumming, Reliability of Student Informants 
and Strip Searches, 231 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1–4 (2008). 
 107. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644. 
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state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges, 
disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically render the 
law unclear if we have been clear.108
This statement—given in an attempt to stave off what will surely 
become the government’s argument in any qualified immunity case, 
namely that the law is not established because some judges disagree—
will likely only further confuse school officials and judges because (1) it 
is unclear if the final part of the sentence, stating that clarity by the 
Supreme Court trumps any lower-court views, applies to the entire 
sentence; and (2) it raises the question of whether the initial statement 
about disuniform views not “guaranteeing” qualified immunity creates a 
strong presumption in favor of qualified immunity; and (3) it leaves 
unclear how many judges are needed to establish a significant enough 
minority view to unsettle the law. 
In sum, while the Court appeared to simply hold that qualified 
immunity protects the defendants in this case and that this was a mere 
run-of-the-mill qualified immunity case, the Court’s statement on how to 
establish whether the law is unclear for qualified immunity purposes will 
likely confound courts in their application of this standard. 
 
D.  The Dissent 
 
Three Justices concurred in part and dissented in part to the Court’s 
opinion: Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Thomas. Each 
justice wrote an individual opinion as to their reasons for dissenting from 
the majority opinion. 
Justice Stevens did not address the Court’s questionable analysis of 
the qualified immunity rule. He avoided the issue by stating the search 
was obviously outrageous.109 His opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, noted that the Court was merely applying T.L.O. and not 
altering it in any way.110 Next, in a restatement of his T.L.O. footnote,111 
he argued that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old student by school 
officials is clearly outrageous conduct.112 Most interesting is Stevens’s 
critique of the majority’s qualified immunity reasoning and rule 
application. He absolutely rejected the proposition that courts should 
consider a split of authority in determining whether there existed settled 
law for qualified immunity purposes when the split arises from a 
Supreme Court decision: “[T]he clarity of a well-established right should 
 108. Id. 
 109. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Supra text accompanying note 38. 
 112. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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not depend on whether jurists have misread our precedents.”113 He points 
out that any time an authority split had been considered by the Court 
regarding qualified immunity, it was to prevent officials from having to 
“‘predict the future course of constitutional law.’”114 However, since this 
case was the straightforward application of T.L.O., a rule already in 
existence, no new course was undertaken; consequently, a split of 
authority should have no impact on the Court’s decision.115
Justice Ginsburg ardently argued that “Wilson’s treatment of 
Redding was abusive and it was not reasonable for him to believe that 
the law permitted it.”116 She obviously agreed with the majority’s finding 
that the search violated Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights, but felt that 
the violation was extreme enough that qualified immunity should not be 
available to the school officials.117 Rather than focus on the type of 
search, as Stevens had, Ginsburg based her dissent on the absolute lack 
of evidence that Savana was hiding pills on her body. She claimed the 
search should have ended with an inspection of Savana’s backpack and 
jacket pockets, and that anything beyond that clearly violated T.L.O. by 
being “‘excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student 
and the nature of the infraction.’”118
Lastly, Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy opinion in which he argued 
that the T.L.O. standard, as applied by the majority, “impose[d] a vague 
and amorphous standard on school administrators. . . [and] grant[ed] 
judges sweeping authority to second-guess” administrators.119
 
III.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY HISTORY 
 
A.  § 1983 Actions 
 
Today, § 1983 actions comprise the vast majority of civil rights 
actions filed in federal courts and form the “backbone of federal civil 
rights enforcement.”120 Tens of thousands of § 1983 actions are filed 
annually.121 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a short statute that provides: 
 113. Id. at 2645. 
 114. Id. at 2645 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). 
 119. Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas’s 
opinion is not discussed in depth because this Note focuses on qualified immunity and he focused on 
the Fourth Amendment standard imposed by the Court. This is not meant to detract from the valid 
argument he posed. 
 120. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS 14:7 (3d ed. 2009). 
 121. Id. 
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .122
Congress originally passed § 1983 in 1871. It was intended, as part 
of the Ku Klux Klan Act,123 to provide a federal remedy for civil rights 
abuses when states failed to act.124 However, the section was utilized 
very infrequently by litigants until the 1960s when the Court began to 
open the § 1983 door by broadly interpreting “actions taken ‘under color 
of law’” in Monroe v. Pape.125
The Monroe Court reversed a dismissal of a § 1983 action.126 
Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago police had broken into his home in 
the early morning without a search or arrest warrant.127 They then made 
him and others stand naked in the living room while a thorough search of 
the home was conducted—which included “emptying drawers and 
ripping mattress covers.”128 After the search, Monroe was taken to the 
police station and questioned for ten hours; he was denied the 
opportunity to call a lawyer or family member.129 After the questioning 
he was released, and no charges were ever filed against him.130 In 
Monroe, the Court opened the door for future § 1983 actions by broadly 
defining actions “under color of law” as “actions taken by state 
government officials in carrying out their official responsibilities, even if 
contrary to state law.”131 It further encouraged future litigation by 
holding that plaintiffs can file a § 1983 action in federal court without 
first seeking redress through state remedies in state courts.132
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 123. Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
 124. SMOLLA, supra note 120, at 14:2. 
 125. 365 U.S. 167, 186 (1961) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2187, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16.); 
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1–2 (2d. ed. 2008). 
While only a handful of § 1983 cases were filed between 1871 and the 1960, the statute still had a 
huge impact on civil rights because Brown v. Board of Education was a § 1983 action. SMOLLA, 
supra note 120, at 14:2. 
 126. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167. 
 127. Id. at 170. 
 128. Id. at 169. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 125, at 2 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173–74). 
 132. Id. 
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have opened the § 1983 door 
further. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Court held that plaintiffs 
were not limited in bringing § 1983 actions against government officials, 
but could also bring the actions against the municipalities that employed 
the officials if the officials were carrying out an official policy133 and if 
the officials acted in good faith.134 During this time the Court also held 
that § 1983 actions could be filed for civil rights violations that occurred 
under color of federal law, thus allowing § 1983 actions based on actions 
by federal government actors.135 The Court did eventually stop opening 
the § 1983 door by holding that there is no respondeat superior regarding 
municipalities; rather, a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if 
its “‘policy’ or ‘custom’” causes the injury.136
The Court was not the only government entity that strengthened § 
1983. Congress also encouraged § 1983 actions by passing the Civil 
Rights Attorney Fees Award Act of 1976, which generally awards 
attorneys fees in successful § 1983 actions.137
It is interesting that the Rehnquist Court, which generally sought to 
restrict broad holdings from the Warren Court, did not place any 
significant restriction on § 1983 actions even though huge numbers of 
these actions were filed annually. A possible explanation for this 
anomaly was the Rehnquist Court’s preference for civil remedies over 
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.138
 
B.  The Qualified Immunity Defense 
 
Just as the Court opened the door to § 1983 civil rights actions, it 
also created an affirmative defense to these actions, namely qualified 
immunity.139 The Court originally established the qualified immunity 
defense in the 1967 case Pierson v. Ray.140 In Pierson, which was 
decided six years after the Court opened the § 1983 door in Monroe, 
 133. SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 125, at 2–3 (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of 
Soc. Serv.s, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
 134. Smolla, supra note 125, at 14:2 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 
(1980)). 
 135. Id. at 14:5 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)). 
 136. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 
694) (providing a list of citations to plurality and concurring opinions to support the statement, “We 
have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior.”). 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006); Smolla, supra note 120, at 14:6. 
 138. This topic is not discussed at length in this paper, but I have written briefly on it 
elsewhere. Eric Clarke, Note, Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey: The Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Hearings Contradicts the Supreme Court’s Lopez-Mendoza 
Decision, 2010 BYU L. REV. 51, 64–65. 
 139. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 671 (2009). 
 140. 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); see also Leong, supra note 139, at 671. 
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fifteen clergymen were arrested in Mississippi after ignoring segregation 
signs in a bus terminal.141 They were charged with congregating “in a 
public place under circumstances . . . that [may cause] a breach of the 
peace” and refusing to move “when ordered to do so by a police 
officer.”142 The clergymen were convicted in a bench trial, but on appeal 
a new trial was ordered.143 In the subsequent trial all charges were 
dropped.144 The clergymen brought a § 1983 action against the judge 
who convicted them and the arresting police officers.145 A jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the judge and police officers.146 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed as to the judge, granting him absolute immunity, but reversed as 
to the officers.147 The circuit court noted that subsequent to the arrest, but 
prior to this action, the Mississippi law allowing the arrest had been 
declared unconstitutional.148 Thus, even though the law was in effect at 
the time of the arrest and the officers had been acting in good faith and 
the officers had probable cause, they were liable for a § 1983 
violation.149 The Supreme Court affirmed the judicial immunity but 
reversed the circuit court’s ruling regarding the officers.150
The Court held that the affirmative defense of good faith and 
probable cause, which was available to police officers under the common 
law, was available in § 1983 actions.151 The Court remanded for a new 
trial in which a jury was to determine if “the officers reasonably believed 
in good faith that the arrest was constitutional.”152 In Pearson the Court 
established a qualified immunity defense, though not explicitly calling it 
this, for police officers based on subjective good faith and probable 
cause—or in other words, on whether the officers had a reasonable, good 
faith belief that their action was constitutional.153 In subsequent cases the 
Court provided two policy justifications for this early form of qualified 
immunity: first, it was to protect government officials from civil 
monetary actions when they acted in good faith, and second, it sought to 
 141. 386 U.S. 547, 549. 
 142. Id. at 549 (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. at 549–50. 
 144. Id. at 550. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 550–51. The circuit court avoided such an unjust outcome in this case by ordering a 
new trial due to bias-creating questioning of the clergy witnesses, which had been allowed, and by 
holding that if a jury found the clergymen had gone to Mississippi planning on being arrested, then 
they would have waived any claim of unlawful arrest. Id. at 551. 
 150. Id. at 557–558. 
 151. Id. at 557. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 822–23 (2009). 
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ensure that officials were not prevented from executing their “office[s] 
with the requisite decisiveness and judgment”—or to prevent a “chilling 
effect” on decision-making due to fear of losing one’s personal 
property.154
However, the Court eventually rejected the subjective good-faith 
prong of qualified immunity analysis and began justifying qualified 
immunity on the policy of resolving “‘insubstantial claims’ against 
government officials . . . prior to discovery.”155 In its 1982 decision 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,156 the Court fundamentally changed qualified 
immunity by establishing a purely objective test.157 By the time Harlow 
was decided, qualified immunity was an established doctrine that applied 
broadly to government officials and not solely to police officers.158 
When Harlow was argued the qualified immunity test had an objective 
and subjective prong. The objective prong was whether the government 
official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took 
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the 
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”159 The subjective prong was 
whether the official “took the action with the malicious intention to cause 
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the [plaintiff].”160
In Harlow the Court addressed whether qualified immunity was 
proper for aides to President Richard Nixon in an action for unlawful 
termination brought by an Air Force Officer.161 The aides argued that in 
order for qualified immunity to successfully allow “‘insubstantial 
lawsuits to be quickly terminated,’”162 specifically prior to trial, the 
subjective good-faith prong of the qualified immunity test must be 
eliminated.163 The Court agreed. It eliminated good faith as a policy 
justification of qualified immunity, stating that qualified immunity 
sought to balance the need of allowing a “realistic avenue for vindication 
 154. Nicole B. Lieberman, Note, Post-Johnson v. Jones Confusion: the Granting of Back-
Door Qualified Immunity, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 567, 568–69 (1997) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
U.S. 232, 241 (1974)). 
 155. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982)). 
 156. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 157. Leong, supra note 139, at 672 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16, 818). 
 158. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (“For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.”). 
 159. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (applying qualified immunity to school 
board members), quoted in Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. 
 160. Id., quoted in Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. 
 161. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. The Court also addressed whether absolute immunity was 
proper. Id. 
 162. Id. at 814 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978)) (internal brackets 
omitted). 
 163. Id. at 814–15. 
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of constitutional guarantees”164 against the various social costs accrued 
when suit is brought against government officials, namely “expenses of 
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, . . . 
the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office[, and] . . . 
the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the 
most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”165 The Court rejected the good-
faith prong because, as a question of fact, it prevented qualified 
immunity from being applied early on in summary judgments and 
because broad and distracting discovery was often required to prove 
good or bad faith.166 Thus, the Court held that to establish qualified 
immunity, a government official only had to establish that her conduct 
did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”167
The Harlow decision required that the Court redefine the 
justifications for the qualified immunity defense. Before Harlow, 
qualified immunity was often referred to as “good faith” immunity,168 
and Harlow was significant because it abandoned the subjective element 
of qualified immunity. What is often overlooked is that the Court had to 
completely redefine the policy justifications for qualified immunity in 
abandoning its subjective element. The Harlow Court essentially stated 
that qualified immunity was principally meant to prevent government 
distraction from baseless lawsuits by facilitating early dismissal of such 
actions.169 This policy has been cited by the Court in subsequent cases 
and remains the principal justification for qualified immunity.170 Thus, 
rather than merely protect government actors from having to pay civil 
damages, qualified immunity is meant also to protect them from having 
to mount time-consuming defenses to civil actions. It is “an entitlement 
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” and thus provides 
“an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”171
 
C.  Saucier v. Katz: Sequencing and Reasonableness 
 164. Id. at 814 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 506). 
 165. Id. at 814 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d 
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)). 
 166. Id. at 816–17. 
 167. Id. at 818. 
 168. Id. at 815. 
 169. See id. at 814–15. 
 170. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“[T]he goal of qualified immunity 
[is] to ‘avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial 
claims on summary judgment.’” (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)). 
 171. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (italics omitted), quoted in Saucier, 533 
U.S. at 200–01. 
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The test for qualified immunity has not changed since Harlow,172 but 
the Court has taken efforts to protect the policy established in Harlow 
and ensure that judges can apply qualified immunity early on in 
litigation.173 For two decades following Harlow, the Court struggled with 
the question of whether the two prongs that currently comprise the 
qualified immunity test must be analyzed in any particular order.174 The 
Court reached the conclusion to this question in Saucier v. Katz by 
stating that qualified immunity had a two-prong test that must be applied 
in order. The first prong is whether “the facts alleged show the 
[government official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right.”175 Then, 
only if that prong is met, the court should ask whether the constitutional 
right was clearly established, or in other words “whether it would be 
clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation.”176 This second prong boils down to whether the official was 
put on notice by existing law that her act was unlawful. 
While the Court based this sequencing requirement on the need to 
clarify the law regarding the violation of constitutional rights in order to 
put officials on notice, the decision did not explicitly state this rational. 
Interestingly, even though prior cases had hinted at sequencing and a 
circuit split existed over whether there was a mandatory sequence,177 the 
Court only dedicated one paragraph to establishing and justifying the 
sequencing rule.178 It merely stated that sequencing was necessary and 
“one reason” supporting sequencing was “the law’s elaboration from 
case to case.”179 No other justifications were given. This single reason 
has been widely accepted as the policy justification.180 In order to put 
 172. In the 2009 decision of Pearson v. Callahan, the Court quoted the holding from Harlow 
as the qualified immunity rule. 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity 
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.’” (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)). 
 173. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 174. See Leong, supra note 139, at 672–73. 
 175. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 176. Id. at 202. 
 177. See Leong, supra note 139, at 672–73. 
 178. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil 
Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53, 58 (2008) 
(“[T]he Court has trumpeted, often explicitly, the importance of norm-announcement over the 
competing principle of constitutional avoidance, focusing on the value of creating clear rules to 
guide lower courts and public officials . . . .”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816 
(2009) (“This two step procedure, the Saucier Court reasoned, is necessary to support the 
Constitution’s ‘elaboration from case to case’ and to prevent constitutional stagnation. ‘The law 
might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the 
law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.’” 
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government officials on notice, courts need to establish the law by 
making determinations of what conduct is unconstitutional.181
While Saucier is generally only cited for its sequencing rule, the bulk 
of the decision addresses whether qualified immunity is applicable as a 
separate standard when the overarching issue of a case is the 
reasonableness of a government official’s actions.182 In Saucier, Katz 
was arrested and alleged undue force was used when he was shoved into 
a police van.183 The district court denied the government’s argument that 
qualified immunity required summary judgment on the excessive force 
claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.184 It held that because an officer’s use 
of excessive force was governed by a reasonableness standard (whether 
the force was reasonable in the situation) and qualified immunity also 
relies on a reasonableness standard in its second prong (“if a reasonable 
officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that 
his conduct was lawful”), then the reasonableness at issue in both rules 
was identical. Because it was the basis for the cause of action, a jury 
should decide the reasonableness question.185 This holding by the Ninth 
Circuit consequently implied that qualified immunity would not be 
grounds for summary judgment any time an excessive-force claim was 
brought before a court. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.186 Six justices agreed 
that qualified immunity was still applicable in instances when the cause 
of action at issue turned on the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
actions.187 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained that 
reasonableness regarding excessive force was governed by a test that 
balanced several factors,188 but reasonableness regarding qualified 
immunity asked the separate question of whether the officer had a 
reasonable misunderstanding of the law.189 Thus, under the second prong 
of qualified immunity, a judge is to determine whether the government 
official who violated a constitutional right did so because, due to a 
reasonable misunderstanding of the law, she thought her action was 
lawful.190
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (internal citations omitted)). 
 181. See supra note 180. 
 182. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197–216 . 
 183. Id. at 198. 
 184. Id. at 199. 
 185. Id. at 199–200. 
 186. Id. at 196 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 205. 
 189. Id. at 202–04. 
 190. This could be termed the “objective legal reasonableness” test. See Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (“Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be 
held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal 
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Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer dissented. Justice Ginsburg 
argued that qualified immunity and excessive force “both hinge on the 
same question,” and the Court’s decision “holds large potential to 
confuse” lower courts.191 She disagreed with the Court’s splitting of 
objective reasonableness into two parts, where the legality of the act 
applies to qualified immunity and is separate from the actual action 
taken. She would have rather held that the two-part qualified immunity 
test outlined in prior cases was inapplicable to excessive-force cases.192
The Court recently overturned the Saucier sequencing in Pearson v. 
Callahan.193 In this unanimous decision the Court rejected mandatory 
sequencing of the qualified immunity prongs.194 Otherwise, Pearson 
does not discuss qualified immunity in detail. The Court relied on the 
second prong of the qualified immunity test to hold that police officers 
did not violate clearly established law when they entered a residence 
without a warrant based on the consent-once-removed doctrine, which 
had already been adopted in other jurisdictions but not yet by the 
Supreme Court.195 The Court has not addressed the reasonableness issue 
from Saucier in subsequent decisions. 
 
D.  Qualified Immunity Today 
 
A summary of qualified immunity as the rule currently exists will be 
helpful before moving on to discuss why it does not fit with the school 
search rule established in T.L.O. and Safford. Today, qualified immunity 
protects government officials from suit and civil liability if they have not 
been given constructive notice that any particular action is unlawful.196 
Because it offers protection from suit, government officials can 
immediately file an interlocutory appeal when summary judgment is 
denied on qualified immunity grounds.197
Qualified immunity provides protection from the “‘hazy border’” 
between permitted and unlawful conduct.198 The general rule is that 
qualified immunity protects government officials if “‘their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonableness’ of the action . . . .” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982))). 
 191. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 192. Id. at 214. 
 193. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
 194. Id. at 818. 
 195. Id. 822–23. 
 196. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206; See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815. The term “constructive” is not 
used in the Supreme Court cases, but I use it here because it accurately portrays the rule. 
 197. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009). 
 198. Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. 
Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997), quoted in Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. 
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reasonable person would have known.’”199 The rule has been broken 
down into two prongs. The first prong is whether “‘the facts alleged 
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.’”200 The 
second prong is “‘whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of 
the specific context of the case.’”201 The actual test used to determine the 
second prong is “the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, 
assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the 
time it was taken.’”202 Judges can determine which prong to address 
first.203 Generally, this will only matter when one of the prongs dictates 
that qualified immunity should be granted, in which instances a judge 
may grant summary judgment after only analyzing that specific prong. 
 
IV.  THE DOUBLE REASONABLENESS STANDARD IS INAPPLICABLE IN 
SCHOOL SEARCHES 
 
A.  The T.L.O. Reasonableness Standard 
 
1.  The Court has correctly determined that probable cause is not the 
appropriate standard for school searches 
 
In T.L.O., the Court correctly established a reasonableness standard 
to govern school searches rather than probable cause. While school 
searches are generally conducted by administrators, there are times when 
it may be preferable for a teacher to conduct the search. It would be 
absolutely unrealistic to expect teachers to remain abreast of probable 
cause law because the law is complex and changes regularly. Indeed, law 
students spend the bulk of the criminal procedure course studying 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. 
Peace officers undergo a similar, extensive training regarding probable 
cause and Fourth Amendment standards; they also must receive 
continuing education because this area of the law regularly changes.204 
The judiciary expects police officers to remain familiar with probable 
cause law because they apply the probable cause standard to their 
decisions on a regular basis.205 School teachers and, to a lesser extent, 
 199. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 200. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 
 201. Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 
 202. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)). 
 203. Id. at 818. 
 204. Chief Ken Wallentine, Lecture at BYU Law School (on or about October 6, 2009). 
 205. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey 536 F.3d 1012 1016–19 (9th 2008) en banc 
(holding that officers had egregiously violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the residence of a 
suspected undocumented immigrant because of case law establishing the unconstitutionality of 
searches and seizures inside a home). But see Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“Likewise, 
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administrators, on the other hand, cannot be expected to remain aware of 
Fourth Amendment search standards. They do not undergo an extensive 
training on the subject, and may not receive any training on the Fourth 
Amendment in their preparatory studies to earn a teaching certificate.206 
Teacher training should focus on other areas that will improve students’ 
educational experiences. Teachers should not have to spend time learning 
Fourth Amendment law—especially in continuing education situations 
where time in seminars replaces time in the classroom with students. 
However, if the law did require that teachers remain abreast of Fourth 
Amendment law, some continuing education would have to be devoted 
annually to this subject. Dedicating such valuable continuing education 
time to Fourth Amendment law would negatively impact students by 
eliminating more necessary and useful training opportunities for 
teachers. 
Because the majority of school searches are conducted by school 
administrators, proponents of a higher school search standard may argue 
that the ever evolving reasonable suspicion, or even probable cause, are 
appropriate standards for school searches. After all, administrators are 
expected to follow changes in the law much more closely than teachers, 
and they are required generally to take a class that covers students’ First 
and Fourth Amendment rights before earning an administrator 
certificate.207 Furthermore, in conferences administrators have the 
opportunity to discuss current legal matters with one another.208
This argument fails because school search law would still apply to 
teachers in addition to administrators. As long as teachers are able to 
conduct searches—which is necessary due to the many possible 
scenarios that can arise in modern classroom—reasonableness and not 
probable cause should be the standard. Courts could adopt a lower 
standard for teacher searches than school administrator searches;209 
however, such a standard would be very difficult to apply due to the 
difficulty of classifying some staff members as either administrators or 
teachers. Furthermore, this proposed rule may encourage teachers, who 
search and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and 
who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of ‘probable cause.’”). 
The fact that the Gates Court held police officers to a lower standard speaks to the slippery slope that 
threatens § 1983 actions if some government employees are given increased protections under 
qualified immunity than those traditionally given to law enforcement. 
 206. For example, as a former elementary school teacher, I never received any training on the 
subject. 
 207. See, e.g., ARIZONA DEP’T OF EDUC. – CERTIFICATION UNIT, REQUIREMENTS FOR 
PRINCIPAL CERTIFICATE, PREKINDERGARTEN – 12, pt. 6, available at 
http://www.ade.state.az.us/certification/requirements/ 
admin/RequirementsforPrincipalCertificate.pdf (requiring at least three credit hours of school law). 
 208. Professor Scott Ellis Ferrin, Lecture at BYU Law School (on or about October 21, 2009). 
 209. This alternative was originally made by Professor Scott Ellis Ferrin of BYU. 
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would have higher protections, to conduct searches rather than having 
better trained administrators conduct them. 
 
2.  The T.L.O. Court correctly concluded that common sense 
reasonableness is the appropriate standard for school searches 
 
The T.L.O. Court also correctly defined reasonableness for school 
search purposes as “the dictates of reason and common sense.”210 The 
Court could have defined reasonableness in school searches as 
reasonable suspicion. While the Court did provide a specific two-prong 
test (“whether the . . . action was justified at its inception . . . [and] 
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified” the search211), it did not state that 
“reasonable suspicion” was required.212 Reasonable suspicion is a term 
of art in Fourth Amendment law and has its own set of standards that, 
like probable cause, are often altered or adjusted by the courts.213 By 
requiring reasonableness defined by “common sense” rather than 
reasonable suspicion as defined by the courts, the T.L.O. Court affirmed 
the policy that school officials should not be expected to follow the 
intricacies of Fourth Amendment law.214
 
B.  The Second Prong— Reasonableness Prong—of the Qualified 
Immunity Test Directly Contradicts the Reasonableness Required in 
T.L.O. 
 
Qualified immunity does not fit with T.L.O. because qualified 
immunity looks at whether the law effectively put the government actor 
on notice that her actions would violate a constitutional right, while 
T.L.O. rejects the notion that teachers should be required to remain 
abreast of the law.215 Consequently, teachers could never be put on 
notice by the law and will always be protected by qualified immunity. 
 210. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985). 
 211. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 212. Id. at 342. 
 213. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (holding that reasonable 
suspicion of dangerousness is the appropriate standard for vehicle searches and rejecting the 
previous bright-line rule of always allowing searches of a vehicle incident to an arrest). 
 214. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343. 
 215. The Court has used common sense in other school law areas rather than more formalistic 
legal approaches. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (referring to its holding that 
some, minimal due process is due to students suspended from school for less than ten days as 
“requirements which are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon 
himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions”). 
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This changes qualified immunity into absolute immunity in school search 
cases. 
The second-prong of the qualified immunity test does not explicitly 
rely on reasonableness; it addresses whether the constitutional right at 
issue was clearly established to the extent that the official was put on 
notice that her actions would be unlawful.216 However, the test used to 
apply this prong is whether a reasonable official would have been aware 
of the unlawfulness of the action.217 Thus, we can refer to this as a 
reasonable awareness of the current state of the law. 
On the surface qualified immunity reasonableness (which looks at 
the actor’s awareness of the law) and school search awareness under 
T.L.O. (which looks at common sense) are based on different standards 
and do not conflict. The situation is the same as it was in Saucier, where 
the Court held that two reasonableness tests could be applied because 
they were based on different considerations.218 In light of the clear 
differences between the reasonableness standards, it is no wonder that 
none of the opinions in Safford addressed whether there was any conflict 
between the qualified immunity and T.L.O. standards. 
However, the qualified immunity reasonableness standard directly 
conflicts with the T.L.O. reasonableness standard because it requires 
school officials, to some extent, to be aware of the status of the law. But 
T.L.O. was based on the policy of not requiring school officials to remain 
abreast of the law. T.L.O. absolutely relies on the need to have a standard 
which teachers can be held accountable, without having to require Fourth 
Amendment trainings. Yet, qualified immunity is based on reasonable 
awareness of the current status of Fourth Amendment law. 
 
C.  Reasonable Plus Reasonable Equals an Excuse for Unreasonable 
Actions 
 
When the two reasonable tests from T.L.O. and qualified immunity 
are considered together they lead to a near-absolute immunity for school 
officials who conduct searches. In applying the second prong of qualified 
immunity to school actors, who are not expected to be aware of changes 
in the law, courts can only conclude that a reasonable awareness of the 
law is virtually no awareness at all. Thus, qualified immunity will almost 
always be granted. The only instances where school officials would not 
be granted immunity would be when facts were analogous to cases that 
are so well publicized that it would be reasonable to hold a school 
 216. Supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text. 
 217. Supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 218. Supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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official accountable. Safford may be an example of this as it has been 
well publicized due to the extreme facts. Thus, it could be expected for a 
principal to know it is now unconstitutional to (1) order a strip search (2) 
of a junior high student (3) searching for ibuprofen (4) when there is no 
evidence the student currently has any pills hidden on her body. In 
contrast, it is totally unrealistic to expect teachers to be aware of this new 
rule in school law because the vast majority of them do not follow 
Supreme Court decisions that affect school law. 
 
V.  THE UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF A DOUBLE REASONABLENESS 
STANDARD: CHILLING FUTURE LAW SUITS 
 
A possible dire consequence of the double reasonableness standard is 
a chilling of the impetus to file § 1983 suits against school officials. If 
lower courts accept Justice Stevens’s statement in his concurrence that 
the Court is merely applying T.L.O. and not changing it in any way,219 
then the double reasonableness standard still applies, rather than 
reasonable suspicion, and it will be virtually impossible for a plaintiff to 
overcome qualified immunity. 
The Court held in Safford that qualified immunity protected the 
school officials; thus, the school officials were not expected to apply the 
T.L.O. test and reach the same conclusion as eight members of the 
Court—that the strip search was unreasonable. Consequently, it appears 
that qualified immunity will generally provide immunity to any school 
official unless (1) the facts of a case are extremely close to a prior case 
where the action was held to be unconstitutional and (2) the prior case is 
so widely known that it would be unreasonable for a school official to 
not be aware of it. Safford is the only Supreme Court school search case 
where a search was held unreasonable. Perhaps there are a handful of 
circuit court cases that would be widely enough publicized in their 
jurisdictions that teachers could be held accountable under the double 
reasonableness standard. However, the vast majority of possible school 
search scenarios are not covered by such case law. Thus, a § 1983 action 
seeking damages for any novel school search will end with the district 
court granting qualified immunity, and the plaintiff being left with no 
viable argument to make on appeal. 
Such decisions in cases with novel fact scenarios will have a chilling 
effect on future § 1983 actions. First, and most importantly, the high 
probability that school officials will be granted qualified immunity gives 
plaintiffs a small likelihood of success. Consequently there is extremely 
little incentive to pursue a lawsuit. Perhaps some plaintiffs seek some 
 219. Supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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emotional vindication rather than monetary damages. It is possible that 
such plaintiffs would be willing to pay the costs and fees of a lawsuit in 
hopes of getting a judge to rule that the action was unlawful under the 
first prong of qualified immunity even if the second prong will prevent 
the recovery of any damages. However, even this is unlikely because 
after Pearson, courts are no longer required to consider the 
constitutionality of the action at issue if it is clear the defendant’s 
misunderstanding of the law was reasonable—which will almost always 
be the case with the double reasonableness standard. Thus, judges will 
likely simply find that qualified immunity applies based on the second 
prong of the test and not reach any decision regarding the first prong. 
Furthermore, the filing of future lawsuits will be chilled because any 
appeal of a decision to grant qualified immunity must overcome the 
daunting double reasonableness standard. If qualified immunity should 
clearly be granted because it provides near-absolute immunity to school 
officials who are not expected to know the current status of the law, then 
appellate courts will simply affirm the lower judge’s decision and not 
address the constitutionality of the action at issue. 
Not only will this prevent the plaintiff from obtaining damages, but 
more importantly, affirming based on the second prong of qualified 
immunity will prevent future case law from being formed. For example, 
if the Court had merely addressed the second prong of qualified 
immunity in Safford, then we would not have case law declaring the type 
of search that occurred in Safford unlawful. And, if the trial courts only 
address the second prong, then the appellate courts will not be able to 
review the constitutionality of the act, the first prong, because there 
would be nothing to review. 
 
VI.  SAFFORD MAY FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ISSUE RATHER THAN 
SOLVE IT 
 
The preceding section assumed that Justice Stevens was correct in 
his Safford concurrence—Safford in no way “altered the basic 
framework” of T.L.O.220 This section addresses a different conclusion—
that Safford significantly changed T.L.O. by establishing Terry-type 
reasonable suspicion rather than common sense reasonableness as the 
standard school officials are held to in school search cases. Presumably 
Justice Stevens feared such an interpretation and thus dedicated the first 
two paragraphs of his concurrence to emphatically stating that Safford 
does not change T.L.O. If we accept, though, that Safford does create a 
new standard (and thus find Stevens’s concurrence divergent from the 
 220. Supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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majority decision), then the Court has resolved the issue of near-absolute 
immunity for school officials. But under this reading, the Court distances 
itself from T.L.O.’s policy of not requiring teachers to remain abreast of 
the status of Fourth Amendment law. If this is true, then the holding 
effectually rejects this policy by (1) adopting a complex legal standard of 
reasonable suspicion rather than common sense and (2) using other 
circuit’s strip search cases to determine whether Wilson should be 
granted qualified immunity in a way that would require Wilson to have 
been aware of these cases in order to be aware what law was going to be 
applied to him. 
 
A.  Safford Failed to Follow the “Common Sense” Reasonable Standard 
from T.L.O. 
 
Justice Souter, in writing for the Safford majority, failed to quote the 
“common sense” reasonableness standard from T.L.O. Rather, he 
interpreted T.L.O. as having applied some form of the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard.221 In an open acknowledgement that this is a 
complicated standard, Justice Souter devoted the two paragraphs 
immediately following the statement of this rule to stating that the Court 
has “attempted to flesh out the” standard in “[a] number of our cases,” 
but has failed to do so and thus reverted “to saying that the standards [of 
reasonable suspicion] are ‘fluid concepts that take their substantive 
content from the particular contexts’ in which they are being 
assessed.”222 He next attempted to define reasonable suspicion for school 
searches—even though he had just finished describing it as indefinable—
”as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.”223
Consequently, it is now unclear to what standard teachers are to be 
held. Is it (1) common sense of a reasonable teacher, (2) reasonable 
suspicion under Terry, or (3) “a moderate chance of finding evidence of 
wrongdoing”?224 Rather than clarify and provide an example of how the 
T.L.O. common sense reasonableness standard was to be applied, the 
Court in Safford muddied the water by providing two potential standards 
for courts to use, common sense reasonableness and reasonable 
suspicion. If courts use the reasonable suspicion standard and the Terry 
line of cases, then the double reasonableness problem may be solved. 
However, school officials would then be required, under the second 
prong of qualified immunity, to have some awareness of reasonable 
suspicion law. 
 221. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009). 
 222. Id. (quoting Ornealas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 2638. 
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B.  Basing Qualified Immunity on Case Law from Other Circuits 
 
The fact that the Court cited other circuit cases to justify granting 
qualified immunity may lead lower courts to believe that the Court has 
abandoned common sense reasonableness and rather is going to hold 
school officials to the higher standard of the current status of the law. 
Safford was a Ninth Circuit case, but the Court relied on cases from the 
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. The Court held that the law was unsettled 
because other circuits (and a minority of judges in the Ninth Circuit en 
banc Safford decision) felt that the strip search was reasonable under 
T.L.O. 
Using cases from around the country to address the qualified 
immunity question necessarily implies that school officials are expected 
to have a considerable awareness of the status of the law. As stated 
earlier, the T.L.O. Court got it right when it based its holding on the 
policy that teachers cannot be expected to remain abreast of current case 
law. To rely on circuit court cases outside of the jurisdiction of Safford 
School District all but eviscerates the T.L.O. policy. The reason to look 
to other case law in qualified immunity analysis is not to determine the 
current state of the law, but rather to determine if the government actor 
defendants should have been reasonably aware of the current law.225 By 
relying on the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit cases, the Court has opened the 
door for future courts to reject a qualified immunity defense because of 
agreement among other circuits—even if the circuit governing the school 
district has no case law on the issue. Not only would such decisions 
completely reject the policy of not requiring extensive knowledge of the 
law, but they would also be unjust because teachers simply cannot be 
expected to follow the law in other circuits. 
 
VII.  THE TWO OPTIONS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE 
 
Courts have two available options to resolve the issues left unclear 
by Safford. First, lower courts could conclude that the Court has 
abandoned common sense reasonableness and hold teachers and school 
administrators to the reasonable suspicion standard. However, as this 
Note has continually repeated, it defies common sense to expect teachers 
to remain abreast of Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion law and 
know how the cases, which most commonly surround law enforcement 
activities, should apply to school searches. 
 225. Supra Part III.C. 
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Thus I propose a second and more viable option. The Supreme Court 
should accept another school search case to clarify the law by granting 
teachers absolute immunity in school searches. Alternative remedies 
exist to protect primary-school children’s Fourth Amendment rights, and 
§ 1983 actions are not as necessary as they are in law enforcement or 
other administrative spheres; school boards often face intense political 
pressure from disgruntled parents and this pressure often impacts 
decisions made by the school board, the superintendent, and school 
principals. Thus, a better remedy than seeking monetary damages 
directly from teachers or administrators is to implement formal 
reprimand procedures. This is an efficient remedy because school 
districts routinely call and speak with previous employers of school 
officials. Once a teacher is fired for extremely questionable conduct, it is 
unlikely that teacher will find other work in the education profession.226 
Because there is this alternative remedy, the Court, or Congress, would 
be justified in granting teachers absolute immunity in § 1983 actions 
regarding the Fourth Amendment. 
Granting absolute immunity, and calling it absolute immunity, is the 
right course of action because of the damage that results from the 
alternative. Calling qualified immunity plus, which results from the 
double reasonableness standard, mere qualified immunity increases the 
protections of qualified immunity to such an extent it begins to weaken 
student civil rights protections. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The T.L.O. common sense reasonableness standard, when combined 
with the reasonableness prong in the affirmative defense of qualified 
immunity grants teachers a near-absolute immunity. This is because 
qualified immunity is based on a reasonable understanding of the law, 
and under T.L.O., school officials are not expected to have any 
understanding of the law. They cannot be put on notice by the law 
because they are not expected to know it. The consequences are that 
school officials are almost completely immune from § 1983 actions 
regarding Fourth Amendment searches and that any filing of future 
actions will be chilled by this immunity.  
However, Safford may change the rule from common sense 
reasonableness to Terry-like reasonable suspicion. This would solve the 
near-absolute-immunity problem, but would also be bad law because it 
would unrealistically expect school officials to remain abreast of Fourth 
 226. This assumes that school districts contact previous employers of teachers applying for 
new jobs. 
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Amendment law. Following this track could lead to school officials 
being held liable for Forth Amendment violations in instances where 
circuit courts on the other side of the country had established case law 
that decreed the officials’ actions unconstitutional. Such a high level of 
liability would be destructive to the education field and is the opposite of 
what the Court sought to establish in T.L.O. 
It is now unclear how the new standard for school searches will 
affect qualified immunity. The best solution is to grant school officials 
absolute immunity regarding school searches. However, as this is an 
option open only to the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress. What will 
likely occur is that lower courts will struggle and the law will become 
unclear. Some courts will still apply the T.L.O. standard and school 
officials before such judges will receive near-absolute immunity. Other 
courts will likely apply reasonable suspicion, and in applying qualified 
immunity will look to the ruling of circuit courts from across the country. 
These judges will hold school officials to unrealistically high standard. 
Thus, eventually the Supreme Court will be forced to re-address this 
issue and hopefully will devise a clearer rule that can be applied 
uniformly across the nation. 
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